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SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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 Terrance Peterson, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware granting the defendant’s motion for summary 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





judgment in this employment discrimination action.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1), Peterson filed a complaint, which 
he twice amended with the District Court’s leave, raising various claims related to his 
suspension and termination from his job as a Healthcare Technician in the Ear, Nose, and 
Throat Specialty Clinic at the Wilmington Veterans Affairs Medical Center (WVAMC).  
Peterson’s complaints included claims of race and disability discrimination, retaliation, 
and a hostile work environment.  (ECF 2, 19, 27.)  The Secretary of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (the Secretary) moved to dismiss those claims.  (ECF 13, 23, 30.)  The 
District Court granted those motions as to all of the claims, with the exception of 
Peterson’s allegations of retaliation.  (ECF 17 & 18, 25 & 26, 32 & 33.)  As to that claim, 
the Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment.  (ECF 37.)  The District Court 
granted that motion, holding that Peterson failed to establish that there was a causal 
connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment actions; that the 
Secretary proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for taking those actions; and 
that Peterson failed to show that the Secretary’s non-discriminatory reasons were mere 
pretext for discrimination.  (ECF 41 & 42.)  Peterson appealed.  (ECF 43.)   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review over the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment.1  See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower 
 
1 We also exercise de novo review of orders granting motions to dismiss.  Davis v. 





Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper “if 
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Although “[w]e view 
the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor,” we will conclude 
that “[a] disputed issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which 
a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”  Resch v. Krapf’s Coaches, Inc., 
785 F.3d 869, 871 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).    
 
indicate that he sought to appeal from the orders granting the Secretary’s motions to 
dismiss.  Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (requiring that a notice of appeal “designate the 
judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”).  Although we construe notices of 
appeal liberally, Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010), 
here we agree with the Secretary’s unchallenged contention that Peterson’s intention to 
appeal from the orders granting the motions to dismiss is not apparent.  See Appellee’s 
Br., 26-27; Sulima, 602 F.3d at 184 (“[W]e can exercise jurisdiction over orders not 
specified in the Notice of Appeal if: ‘(1) there is a connection between the specified and 
unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) 
the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.’”) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  Peterson’s brief refers in passing to claims raised 
in his original complaint, arguments that he put forth in opposition to the Secretary’s 
motions to dismiss, and some of the opinions granting those motions.  See Appellant’s 
Br., 3, 6-8.  But he does not argue that the District Court erred in granting the motions to 
dismiss.  Instead, Peterson’s brief focuses on the District Court’s grant of the Secretary’s 
motion for summary judgment.  See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. 
Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that claims were forfeited where 
appellant failed to raise them in her opening brief); Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther 
Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have consistently refused 
to consider ill-developed arguments or those not properly raised and discussed in the 
appellate briefing.”).  Even if we were to consider the orders granting the motions to 
dismiss, we would affirm because, for the reasons provided by the District Court, 
Peterson failed to state claims for relief based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 241 
and 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (ECF 17, at 8), due process violations (ECF 17, at 8-9), violations 
of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (ECF 25, at 10-
11), a hostile work environment (ECF 32, at 6-7), and age, race, and disability 





Peterson brought his retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  We analyze that claim according to the familiar burden-shifting framework 
established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  See 
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-42 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, Peterson had the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If he succeeded, the burden then 
would shift to the Secretary to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for 
his suspension and termination.  See id.  Peterson would then have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason for his suspension 
and termination offered by the Secretary was a pretext.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999); Moore, 461 F.3d at 342.  We will assume, without 
deciding, that Peterson can establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  Nevertheless, the 
District Court properly held that the Secretary articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for Peterson’s suspension and termination, which Peterson failed to rebut.   
The Secretary presented evidence indicating that Peterson was suspended because 
of two encounters that involved serious disruptive, inappropriate, and threatening 
behavior.  In September 2013, Peterson was ordered to attend five anger management 
sessions with Albert Marks, a certified anger management facilitator.2  Mem. of Sept. 10, 
 
2 Participation in the anger management classes was required because the Administrative 
Investigation Board (AIB) had concluded, in June 2013, that Peterson “demonstrated 
disruptive and inappropriate behavior whereas his actions are perceived as threats of 
physical violence, harassment, intimidation, and other threatening behaviors.”  AIB 






2013 (J.A. 331).  Peterson had arrived late for the first session.  Decl. of Albert Marks, ¶ 
3 (J.A. 337).  When Marks pointed out Peterson’s tardiness, Peterson responded in a way 
that Marks perceived to be hostile.  Id.  Marks attempted to talk with Peterson about the 
aggression, but Peterson drove away.  Id.  After this encounter, Marks notified the 
WVAMC via email of the encounter and stated that he did not think that he could assist 
Peterson.  Id.   
Shortly after Peterson left the anger management facility, he “aggressively 
entered” the office of Cynthia Brown, a Human Resources Specialist at WVAMC.3  Decl. 
of Cynthia Brown, ¶ 8 (J.A. 334).  Peterson demanded that Brown find him a new anger 
management facilitator, and became “very angry and even louder” when she tried calm 
him down.  Id.  Brown stated that she felt threatened by Peterson and recalled “looking 
around my office to determine how I could get out of it if he continued to threaten me.”  
Id.  Brown’s account was confirmed by a Human Resources Assistant at the WVAMC.  
Decl. of Karen Newson, ¶ 1-3 (J.A. 342). 
Reports of Peterson’s interactions with Marks and Brown were provided to 
Ruthann Wolski, Peterson’s second-level supervisor, who recommended that Peterson be 
suspended for 10 days.  Decl. of Ruthann Wolski, ¶ 2 (J.A. 345).  Although Wolski was 
aware that Peterson had previously filed EEOC complaints, Wolksi stated that in 
proposing the suspension she did not consider those filings or his statements that he had 
 
3 Although this was the first time that Brown met Peterson in person, Peterson had 
previously called Brown several times.  During several of those conversations, Peterson 
used a “loud and angry voice,” spoke in “an inappropriately loud tone,” and sounded 





engaged in protected activity.  Id. at ¶ 4.  Instead, she based her recommendation on 
Peterson’s “very serious misconduct” in his interactions with Marks and Brown, as well 
as Peterson’s “history of receiving written counseling.”  Id. at ¶ 2.  The final decision 
maker, Mary Alice Johnson, determined that a 10-day suspension was appropriate.  Decl. 
of Mary Alice Johnson, ¶ 2 (J.A. 351).  In making her determination, Johnson “reviewed 
the evidence file that Human Resources prepared, heard [Peterson’s] oral response, and 
reviewed his written reply” to the notice of the proposed suspension.  Id.  Like Wolski, 
Johnson stated that she did not consider Peterson’s prior EEOC complaints.  Id. at ¶ 4.  
Peterson was suspended from December 2, 2013, through December 11, 2013.  Letter of 
November 5, 2013 (J.A. 355).   
Evidence also demonstrated that Peterson was terminated because he performed 
medical procedures outside the scope of his qualifications and continued to threaten staff 
at the WVAMC.  Peterson was not permitted to clean patients’ ears because he lacked the 
training and certification to do so.  Decl. of Ruthann Wolski, ¶ 6 (J.A. 346).  In February 
2013, Peterson’s first-level supervisor, Vanessa Covington, warned him in writing that 
irrigating a patient’s ears was beyond the scope of his duties.  Mem. of Feb. 21, 2013 
(J.A. 357); Decl. of Vanessa Covington, ¶ 3 (J.A. 359).  Despite that warning, Peterson 
cleaned a patient’s ears on October 25, 2013.  Decl. of Betty Reeves, ¶ 2 (J.A. 362); Decl. 
of Vanessa Covington, ¶ 4 (J.A. 359-60); Decl. of Ruthann Wolski, ¶ 6 (J.A. 346).   
 On November 13, 2013, an inventory technician named Mac Benjamin told 
Covington that Peterson was “crazy,” warned her several times that she should be careful, 





Vanessa Covington, ¶ 4 (J.A. 359-60); Decl. of Mac Benjamin, ¶ 2 (J.A. 372-73).  Later 
that month, Peterson threatened to sue Marks over the email that Marks had sent to the 
WVAMC about his September 2013 encounter with Peterson.  Decl. of Albert Marks, ¶ 4 
(J.A. 337-38).  On December 17, 2013, Peterson told his union steward, Johnel Ponzo, 
that he was going to “hurt all of those motherfuckers.”  Decl. of Johnel Ponzo, ¶ 3 (J.A. 
381).  Although Ponzo had heard Peterson make similar comments in the past, Ponzo 
stated that “this time [Peterson] seemed different,” that he “had a distant look in his eyes 
that made me uncomfortable,” and that “I was afraid from [Peterson’s] tone and 
demeanor … that he could do exactly what he said he was going to do.”  Id.  
After receiving reports of these incidents, Johnson recommended that Peterson be 
terminated.  Decl. of Mary Alice Johnson, ¶ 5 (J.A. 352).  Johnson concluded that 
Peterson had provided care outside the scope of his duties and that his “actions could 
have led to serious complications with the patient.”  Id.  She also concluded that Peterson 
had made “threats to the safety and well-being of our staff.”  Id.  Noting that Peterson had 
already received a 10-day suspension for misconduct and that he had been explicitly 
warned not to clean patients’ ears, Johnson found that Peterson demonstrated “a blatant 
disregard for management’s efforts to rehabilitate him to keep him functioning in his 
position.”  Id.  Johnson stated that she did not consider Peterson’s EEOC filings or his 
statements that he had engaged in protected activity.  Id. at ¶ 7.  The Director of the 
WVAMC, Robin Aube-Warren, determined that “there was sufficient evidence that 
proved that [Peterson] had committed the misconduct charged.”  Decl. of Robin Aube-





“intentional, repeated, and that [his] prior discipline had not corrected his behavior.”  Id. 
at ¶ 4.  She stated that she did “not recall being aware” of any protected activity by 
Peterson.  Id. at ¶ 5-10.  Accordingly, Aube-Warren notified Peterson that she sustained 
the charges against him and that his termination was effective April 25, 2014.  Letter of 
Apr. 21, 2014 (J.A. 244-46).    
Peterson has not identified a material issue of fact demonstrating that the 
Secretary’s proffered reasons for his suspension and termination were a pretext for 
discrimination.  To establish pretext under the summary judgment standard, a plaintiff 
must either (1) offer evidence that “casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate 
reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that 
each reason was a fabrication,” or (2) present evidence sufficient to support an inference 
that “discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
adverse employment action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Peterson asserts, without any evidentiary support, that “the agency … falsely accus[ed] 
[him] of threats which shows pretext to conjure up false allegations.”  Appellant’s Br., 
18.  This type of speculation cannot defeat summary judgment.  See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 
750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).  Moreover, it is not sufficient to “show that the 
employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken” because “the factual dispute at issue is 
whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is 
wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.”  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.  On this record, the 
Secretary’s proffered reasons for suspending and terminating Peterson were neither 





them unworthy of credence.  See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 
2003) (per curiam).  Thus, no reasonable juror could conclude that retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment actions. 
In sum, Peterson failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of 
fact for his retaliation claim under Title VII.  We have considered his various arguments 
and conclude that none has merit.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
